Introduction
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, a transnational conversation about race, migration, and national security circulated throughout the Americas and across the Pacific. The subject was the global migration of Asians and the alleged threat they posed. The fact that Asians-especially Chinese, Japanese, and South Asianswere described as being inassimilable aliens who brought economic competition, disease, and immorality is not surprising. Much scholarship has focused on the subject of anti-Asian racism and the campaigns to exclude Asian people, particularly in the United States.
What is astounding, however, is the global scale on which these dis- cussions and campaigns took place. This article explores key moments in the transnational history of Asian migration and exclusion in the Americas. A number of questions frame this project: How does Asian exclusion help us rethink "transnationalism" as both a category of analysis and as a methodology? How does race become a global construct? In other words, how are ideas about racial difference, inferiority, and identity related to the global migration of labor, capital, and culture? How is the "globality of race" (Howard Winant's term) tied to both global flows as well as national processes of nation-building? Lastly, how is the history of Asian exclusion in the Americas significant to the larger global history of race?
First, a little background. Chinese, Japanese, and South Asians were among the largest groups of Asians to migrate to and throughout the Americas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
2 Retaining ties to their homelands and forming networks across national borders, these Asians were like many migrants who practiced transnational migration and formed diasporic communities. But they were also very different, in that they were targets of some of the first national immigration laws that excluded migrants on the basis of race, as well as victims of state-sanctioned violence, expulsion, and incarceration.
I argue that these national policies were not separate phenomena but rather resulted from a transnational anti-Asian racismwhat I have called "hemispheric Orientalism"-that flourished and moved across national boundaries. 3 We see it first in the interconnected debates over Chinese immigration in the United States, Canada, Hawai'i, Mexico, the Caribbean, and parts of Latin America beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. We see it next in the parallel national policies relating to Japanese and South Asian restriction in the early twentieth century and then in the coordinated, hemispheric policies of Japanese incarceration during World War II.
Some parts of this story are familiar, but, too often, they have been told within ethnic-specific or nation-specific histories. We know little about the comparative and transnational origins and consequences of Asian exclusion. We have yet to ask the question of how or if Asian exclusion in one country relates to Asian exclusion in another country. By exploring the circularity and interconnectedness of these campaigns, we are able to relate the national histories of Asians in the Americas together as well as place them within a larger global history of race. 4 Rethinking the "transnational turn" in Asian American studies A central part of this project is to rethink the "transnational turn" in Asian American studies and to examine transnationalism critically, both as a category of analysis and as a methodology. Anthropologists first employed the concept of transnationalism in the 990s to explain the ongoing social relations and networks that immigrants maintained across geographic, cultural, and political borders. 5 In recent years, the transnational turn spread widely throughout the disciplines. 6 Many scholars use a loose definition of transnationalism that focuses on decentering the nation-state altogether. 7 4. Matthew Guterl and Christine Skwiot have argued that the worldwide efforts to "resolve the labor problem in [the] age of emancipation and migration, industrialization and imperialism" were linked together and contributed to the ascendancy of a "singular, unbroken global entity [of] white world supremacy." Matthew Guterl and Christine Skwiot, "Atlantic and Pacific Crossings: Race, Empire, and the 'Labor Problem' in the Late Nineteenth Century," Radical History Review, 9 (2005), 42.
5. Linda G. Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-states (Langhorne, Pa., 994).
6. It is important to remember that African American, Chicano, and Asian American studies have been international and diasporic in their perspectives and politics since their formation. Robin D. G. Kelley, for example, has described the global vision that informed African American historians since the early twentieth century. Inspired by antiracist and anti-imperialist politics, Kelley has written that African American historians insisted on "seeing African American and United States history in global terms [and refused] to allow national boundaries to define their field of vision." Robin D. G. Kelley, " 'But a Local Phase of a World Problem': Black History's Global Vision, 883-950," Journal of American History, 86 (999), 045, 047.
7. David Thelen advocated for scholars to study how "people and ideas and institutions and cultures moved above, below, through, and around, as well as within, the nation state." See David Thelen, "Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on Both of these approaches can be too limiting. In my own work, I examine how racial formations and immigration politics-and not just migrants themselves-have transnational origins and consequences. I have always found that, both historically and today, the nation-state wields enormous power over who and what can cross borders, when, and under what conditions. 8 The power of the nation is especially salient for racialized subjects. Studying diaspora, transnationalism, and the nation are not mutually exclusive projects, and, indeed, I follow in the footsteps of other scholars who call on us to "foreground the transnational and international dimensions of the United States and the Americas" without ignoring the nation-state altogether. 9 A key question for me is how the transnational, national, and international interact with each other. To accomplish this goal, I have focused on racial discourses, cooperation, and policies that have taken place at both the transnational and international levels. This means that I examine the actions and rhetoric of individuals, organizations, and media, as well as state actors and institutions. I rely upon English-and Spanishlanguage government documents, writings, letters, organizational 2. As Gary Okihiro has reminded us, a singular focus on the "east-west filaments" of migration blinds us to the "messier" reality that "migrants moved east and west but also north and south." Gary Okihiro, "Turning Japanese Americans," in Kikumura-Yano, ed., Encyclopedia of Japanese Descendants in the Americas, 25. Scholars working on the Atlantic world also warn against reifying the east-west axis as opposed to a north-south one. Jorge Canizares Esguerra, "Some Caveats about the 'Atlantic Paradigm,'" History Compass, 3 (2005 United States to work on construction projects and in the mines in the northern state of Sonora. 4 At least 2,000 Chinese workers arrived in Louisiana from Cuba in 867. 5 And, according to Cuban historian Juan Pérez de la Riva, a few thousand Chinese were smuggled into Cuba from California via Mexico and New Orleans between 865 and 875. 6 Japanese began to arrive in Canada in 885, and many entered that country in order to get into the United States. In 890, for example, Kihachi Hirakawa bought a ticket from a Yokohama travel agency that brought him to Vancouver, British Columbia. He eventually boarded a small boat heading to Seattle and settled in the United States.
7 South Asian migration to North America originated as a trans-Pacific migration, but it moved along imperial and inter-American axes as well. South Asian Sikhs employed as police in Hong Kong were among the first to emigrate via steamship. 8 By the early 900s a few thousand South Asian laborers had migrated to Canada, and by 907 this migration spilled across the U.S.-Canadian border. 9 Restrictive immigration laws targeting Asians-passed first in the United States-were key elements in redirecting Asian migration around the region as well as prompting illegal immigration.
After the 882 Chinese Exclusion Act barred all Chinese laborers from the United States, Chinese began to migrate first to Canada and Mexico and then crossed the borders illegally. 20 An estimated 7,300 Chinese immigrants entered the United States through the back doors of Canada and Mexico between 882 and 920.
2 U.S. Bureau of Immigration reports and newspaper accounts indicate that they entered the country through Seattle, Buffalo, San Diego, San Antonio, El Paso, and numerous other points along the northern and southern borders. 22 Ports along the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean also became central hubs in the illegal immigration business. American diplomats based in Jamaica reported that commercial vessels brought Chinese on a three-legged journey from Mexico to Jamaica and then to Florida, Louisiana, or Mississippi where they disembarked for northern cities like Baltimore, New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. 29. Okihiro, "Turning Japanese Americans," 25. In Brazil, Article 2 of the constitution declared that annual immigration of any foreign group would be limited to 2 percent of the total number of that foreign population already in Brazil. The amendment was clearly aimed at the Japanese. Nobuya Tsuchida, "The Japanese in Brazil, 908-94" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 978), 29-295. In Peru, the 936 immigration law prohibited the immigration of "racial groups" and targeted Japanese immigration. It also included a requirement that all businesses employ a work force that was at least 80 percent native-born. The law was passed in part out of fear that Japanese immigration to Peru would increase following the passage of Brazil's restrictive law. See C. Harvey Gardiner, The Japanese and Peru, 1873 Peru, -1973 We now understand how a shared history of slavery and racial oppression connected the peoples of the African diaspora in a "Black Atlantic." 3 We also view border zones as sites of crossings, intercultural exchanges, circulations, resistances, and negotiations.
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I build upon Winant's claim that national ideas about racial difference and systems of racial ordering were, in fact, highly interactive and transnational processes. Nation-states developed their own understandings of ethnic and cultural differences through transnational connections and comparisons. 33 However, while Winant argues that the "contemporary world racial system is considerably more interactive and diasporic than it was in the past," I use the case of Asian exclusion to locate an interconnected history and system of race, migration, and subjugation dating back to the midnineteenth century.
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A global "Chinese problem"
Let us turn first to the related debates over Chinese immigration in the Americas and the ways in which racialized images of 30. Howard Winant has examined the history of a "world racial system" of white supremacy, demonstrating how race was a central driving force in the development of the modern world. Winant has also called this history a "racial longue durée" and a study of the "world-historical dimensions of race." He has argued that "the foundation of modern nation-states, the construction of an international economy, and the articulation of a unified world culture were deeply racialized processes. the Chinese circulated throughout the region in the nineteenth century. As Moon-Ho Jung has illustrated, contradictory images and "racial imaginings" of Chinese coolie laborers first "moved around the Greater Caribbean in myriad ways, across geopolitical boundaries," and eventually made their way to Louisiana by the mid-nineteenth century. 35 Along with negative reports on Chinese labor coming from the California goldfields, debates regarding slavery prior to the American Civil War provided a foundational context shaping Americans' introduction to the figure of the Asian coolie. Both abolitionists and pro-slavery activists in the United States closely studied the "coolie problem" in the Caribbean and used the specter of Asian coolies to further their political agendas. Thus, coolies were portrayed either as an industrious labor force that would make slavery unnecessary or as an(other) inferior race that was vulnerable to cruel exploitation, just like African American slaves. Similarly, American missionaries and diplomats in Peru in the 860s and 870s reported back on Chinese coolie labor in that country, as well as on Peruvian attitudes toward Chinese and coolie uprisings. American missionary and diplomat S. Wells Williams published a report in American newspapers that later appeared in the Peruvian press, reprinted in Spanish. 36 The well-publicized 876 Cuba Commission report documenting the extensive abuse of Chinese workers and slave-like conditions there also framed the debate over Asian labor in the Americas. 37 It has thus become clear that Americans' racialized notions of Asian labor originated in the Caribbean, the American South, and South America, as well as in the goldfields of California. helped fan the fires of organized anti-Chinese sentiment, especially in the American West. Chinese workers were blamed for competing unfairly with white workers. Chinese as a race were charged with being inassimilable, inferior, and immoral. 39 Like the earlier transnational discourses surrounding Chinese coolie labor in the Caribbean and South America, the debates over large-scale Chinese immigration traversed geographic and political boundaries as well. As the country with the largest population of Chinese migrants and as the originating point of many of the racialized campaigns against the Chinese, the United States played an important role in these debates and in the circulation of Orientalism abroad. Newspapers outside of the United States routinely reprinted articles on Chinese immigration that had originally appeared in the United States. When the Canadian and Mexican governments launched their own investigations of Chinese immigration, they began by reviewing the evidence compiled by American authorities. 40 But antiChinese racism also intersected with unique regional or national contexts in various countries. This is a central point: Orientalism and Asian exclusion in the Americas were dynamic, heterogeneous processes. They did not migrate "intact" to other locales.
Let us take a closer look at Mexico. On the one hand, antiChinese sentiment in Mexico was clearly influenced by events in the United States. Anti-Chinese leaders in Mexico drew upon wellknown Chinese stereotypes circulating throughout the Americas. Chinese immigration was described in familiar catastrophic terms, such as the "yellow wave," the "yellow plague," and the "Mongol invasion." 4 A federal commission studying Chinese immigration in 9 concluded that it was "not advisable for the national interests to permit the unlimited immigration of Chinese." As Robert Chao Romero has pointed out, "much of the basis for the position lay in the familiar North American argument that Chinese were unwilling to assimilate, were sojourners, and would hurt the economic advancement of the country's indigenous population." 42 AntiChinese illustrations published in Mexico also had a striking resemblance to those from the United States. 43 But the anti-Chinese movement in Mexico, especially in the northern state of Sonora where it was strongest, was also inextricably shaped by the Mexican Revolution that led to the overthrow of dictator Porfirio Díaz in 9. Díaz's modernization campaign had encouraged foreign investment at the expense of the Mexican farmer/peasant classes. Sonorans who already felt besieged by the heavy infiltration of U.S. capital grew increasingly resentful of the large presence of Chinese in small businesses. In some towns, Chinese enjoyed a monopoly in local commerce.
Schoolteacher and businessman José María Arana led the anti-Chinese movement in Sonora in the 90s. His fiery speeches and racist tracts railed against the "evils and vices of the Chinese," pitting them against the progress and national regeneration of the Mexican nation, two themes born out of the revolution. 44 His anti-Chinese newspaper was called Pro-Patria, for the motherland. He found support among Mexican workers and landless peasants who complained in 97 that "the Chinese succeed[ed] while we are forced to close our doors, [starve] our families" and send the youth to the United States for work. 45 Arana's letters indicated as well that Mexicans in the United States also supported the antiChinese campaign in Sonora.
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Shaped by both the Mexican Revolution and a common North American racialization of the Chinese, the anti-Chinese movement in Mexico reveals one way in which hemispheric Orientalism worked and the fact that it was in no way unique. Similar strands of anti-Chinese sentiment translated into restrictions on Chinese immigration in the United States, Canada, Mexico, Peru, Australia, and New Zealand by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, the modes and practices of Chinese restriction differed in each country. International relations, treaties, state-building, and legal and political institutions in each country affected how Asian exclusion would be carried out in the early twentieth century. In the United States and Australia, Chinese were excluded explicitly on the basis of race. In Canada, they were restricted through head taxes. In Mexico, both local and federal laws attempted to discourage Chinese immigration and settlement. By the 920s and 930s Chinese immigrants were almost completely barred in Canada and Peru, and Chinese residents of northwestern Mexico were forcibly expelled in 93. 47. The Chinese Exclusion Act in the United States prohibited the further immigration of Chinese laborers, allowed only a few select classes of Chinese immigrants to apply for admission, and affirmed the prohibition of naturalized citizenship on all Chinese immigrants. Chinese Exclusion Act, 58, ch. 26. In Australia, the 90 Immigration Restriction Act, which established the "White Australia Policy," followed the desire of the British Empire not to discriminate explicitly on the basis of race, but it still achieved its central goal of greatly restricting Chinese immigration. It did so by barring all immigrants who could not pass a dictation test in any European language. Myra Willard, "The History of the "White Australia" Policy," Royal Australian Historical Society Journal and Proceedings, vol. 8, part (922), 3-5, 0-3. Canada restricted Chinese immigration by imposing a $50 head tax on all Chinese laborers. The head tax was raised to $00 in 900 and then to $500 in 903. Chinese exclusion represented just the first stage in a global restriction movement targeting Asian immigrants. Largely in response to the labor shortages caused by the restriction of Chinese labor, migration from Japan, India, Korea, and the Philippines to the Americas increased dramatically. Lumped together as inassimilable Orientals, these immigrants often found that they faced the same racial stereotypes and discrimination as the Chinese before them. Transnational debates over the new "problem" of Japanese immigration, in particular, including the characterization of Japan and Japanese as the "Yellow Peril," intensified by the early 900s. In this context, the transnational character of Asian exclusion in the Americas underwent a significant shift. Whereas the debates over Chinese immigration had become interconnected by a transnational discourse about race, the movement to exclude Japanese immigrants moved beyond shared rhetoric. Instead, it encompassed actual cooperation and policy coordination, promoting what I call the "White Pacific," a racial and geographic imaginary in which Orientalism and anti-Asian policies were shared and replicated among white settler societies in the region. spring, summer, and fall of 907, anti-Asian sentiment along the Pacific coasts of the United States and Canada turned violent. In May Japanese restaurants and bathhouses were targeted and damaged in San Francisco. In early September a mob of 50 white men attacked the South Asian community in Bellingham, Washington. The call to "drive out the Hindus" was heard throughout the city, and by the next day 25 South Asians had been driven out of town and were on their way to British Columbia. Just three days later, an estimated crowd of 0,000 gathered in Vancouver to support an anti-Asian parade. The group soon turned into a rioting mob that attacked almost every building occupied by Chinese immigrants and several dozen in the Japanese quarter. Each riot had different and unique origins. In San Francisco, a school board order to segregate Japanese students emboldened anti-Japanese activists. In Bellingham, South Asian immigrants were allegedly hired to take the place of white workers at a local lumber plant. In Vancouver, exclusionists became alarmed over a sudden increase in Chinese, Japanese, and South Asian immigration that seemed to plague the city that summer. Yet, like the different national campaigns to restrict Chinese immigration, the 907 riots along the Pacific Coast were not isolated events. Both the causes of the race riots and their long-term consequences were part of an intricate web of cross-border and transnational processes, linkages, and alliances.
Anti-Asian activists in both the Pacific Northwest and British Columbia drew inspiration from the San Francisco-based Asiatic Exclusion League (AEL). By the summer of 907, there were AEL chapters in Seattle, Bellingham, and Vancouver.
49 Their organization around Asian restriction helped to spark both the expulsion campaign in Bellingham and the riots in Vancouver in ways that connected these two local events within a larger transnational frame. Vancouverites learned of the Bellingham riots just as they were completing plans for an anti-Asian parade in Vancouver that would "bring the white people to a state of enthusiasm." 50 As one Vancouverite later told a newspaper reporter, Bellingham served as a "contagious example." 5 American leaders of the AEL also recognized the importance of linking U.S. and Canadian efforts to restrict Asian immigration, and they rushed to Vancouver to lend their support. Arthur E. Fowler, the founder of the Seattle AEL, traveled to Bellingham to assess the results of the riots on Friday, September 6. The next morning, he continued his journey to Vancouver to participate in the parade that evening. Joining him were other leaders of Washington's exclusion and labor movements.
52 While marchers carried signs proclaiming "A white Canada and no cheap Asiatic labor," Fowler delivered a rousing speech from a telegraph pole in the middle of the business district. He explained how Americans in Bellingham had dealt with the problem of South Asian immigration, and he proposed a march through Chinatown.
53 By three o'clock the next morning, many immigrants and rioters had been wounded, and the mob had inflicted almost $40,000 in property damages. 54 The Vancouver, Bellingham, and San Francisco riots of 907 had two main consequences. First, the United States and Canada began negotiations with Japan for voluntary bans on the immigration of Japanese laborers. Although the two countries acted separately, the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreements" with Japan were completed almost simultaneously. The U.S. agreement was finalized on January 25, 908; Canada's was finalized three days later. Born of cross-border Orientalism and anti-Asian activism, the Gentlemen's Agreements reflect the parallel policies toward Japa-nese immigration established by the United States and Canada by the early 900s. In the Canadian agreement, Japan voluntarily agreed to restrict the number of passports issued to male laborers and domestic servants to an annual maximum of 400. Four classes of people were to be permitted to enter Canada: returning residents and their wives, children, and parents; emigrants specially engaged by Japanese residents in Canada for personal or domestic service; laborers under specifically worded contracts approved by the Canadian government; and agricultural laborers contracted by Japanese resident agricultural holders in Canada, limited to ten for each 00 acres of land owned. A definite limitation would not be set by the Japanese, because this would have required a revision of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 902. Secondary immigration from Hawai'i came under a separate category and was later covered under the "continuous journey" legislation passed by the Canadian Parliament on January 8, 908. 55 In the American agreement, the Japanese government agreed not to issue passports for entry into the continental United States to any laborers, skilled or unskilled, but passports would be issued to "laborers who have already been in America and to the parents, wives, and children of laborers already resident there."
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The riots' second consequence was that Canada, the United States, and the British Empire all focused attention more squarely on the international aspect of the "Asiatic issue," thereby uniting "white men's countries" together against the "Yellow Peril." In London, the editors of the Spectator discussed the mutual goal of the "Anglo-Saxon oversea [sic] , both in America and in Australia and New Zealand," to remain "white men's countries" in the face of Japanese immigration. 57 The New York-based Outlook editorialized that the anti-Asian riots signaled a serious problem that "extends beyond the National boundaries." 57. "Japan, America, and the Anglo-Saxon World," Spectator (London), July 3, 907, p. 40. 58. "Oriental Immigration," Outlook, Sept. 2, 907, p. 99.
advocated "unity of action" among the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and Australia that would promote a "White Pacific," where white supremacy would be maintained in the face of an ascendant Japan. 59 "There should be no immigration in mass of Orientals to the countries where the English-speaking peoples now form and will form the population of the future," he wrote to British politician Arthur Hamilton Lee. 60 No formal coordinated action resulted, but Roosevelt used the U.S. Navy's famous sixteen-battleship Pacific tour (December 907 to February 909) to demonstrate Anglo-American unity against the "Yellow Peril" that Japanese immigration represented. 6 As he told William Lyon Mackenzie King, the fleet "may help them understand that we want a definite arrangement" over immigration.
62 Theodore Roosevelt also informed members of the Canadian Parliament that the U.S. fleet was making rounds throughout the Pacific "in the interests of British Columbia, Australia, as well as California." 63 As Margaret Werry has demonstrated, the tour was part of a larger theatrical spectacle intended to mark the U.S. entry onto the world stage. The tour sent a forceful message of "national and racial solidarity on the one hand, and imperial advancement on the other."
64 Painted white and gold and dubbed the "Great White Fleet," the sixteen ships were surrounded by pageantry throughout their tour. The fleet first circumnavigated South America, stopped in San Francisco and Puget Sound, and then crossed the Pacific to Hawai'i, Auckland, and Sydney. 65 In New Zealand and Australia, the arrival of the White Fleet and its celebrated reception illustrated the role that race, Asian immigration, and Japanese imperialism played in the tour. 66 In the face of an ascendant Japan, Australia and New Zealand looked to the United States. Theodore Roosevelt told a reporter for the New York Times that the fleet's visit to New Zealand and Australia would confirm that the colonies were "white man's countr [ies] ." 67 A popular poem in Australia also reflected similar sentiments with its concluding lines: "For the sake of our race of the future, Hail! Men of America, Hail!" 68 Thus, huge, jubilant crowds in Sydney and Auckland greeted the tour and celebrated the "freedom" of the Anglo-Saxon Pacific, protected by the United States. 69 The message that the white settler societies of the Pacific shared a "mingled destiny" to preserve whiteness by excluding Asians was best illustrated in the "Fleet Week" issue of Freelance, an illustrated magazine in New Zealand. On the title page was a cartoon of a small boyish figure titled "New Zealand" shaking hands with a towering Uncle Sam whose protective stance spread from the United States across the entire Pacific and onto New Zealand. "Now, Uncle, let them all come," says the boy. "Brown or yellow, we'll keep a white flag over our lands!" 70 As this cartoon, the Navy's White Fleet, the two Gentlemen's Agreements, and the race riots of 907 illustrate, the issue of Asian (Washington, D.C., 998); James R. Reckner, Teddy Roosevelt's Great White Fleet (Annapolis, Md., 988).
65. There is no direct evidence that the fleet's white color was intentionally meant to be read as a symbol of white supremacy. But the imperialistic mission of the fleet's tour was expressed explicitly by Rear Admiral Charles S. Sperry, who commanded the fleet. In a letter to his wife Edith, he explained that the tour was "establish[ing] a curious sort of protectorate-a new Monroe Doctrine." Charles S. Sperry to Edith Sperry, Sept. 9, 908, box 5, Charles Stillman Sperry Papers, Library of Congress, as cited in Werry, " 'The Greatest Show on Earth,' " 363, especially n. 24.
66. Werry, " 'The Greatest Show on Earth,' " 364. Werry has explained that, for these countries, the tour "intersected with an impatient nationalism straining against the ties of colonial fealty" and growing anxieties over Asian immigration, the result of the "same globalizing momentum that had brought Asian migrants to California." 67. The large-scale incarceration of Japanese during World War II was thus coordinated and hemispheric in scope, the end result of nearly 00 years of transnational anti-Asian racism throughout the Americas.
Conclusion
Let me conclude by returning to the issues of transnationalism and global racial formation with which I began. Transnational frameworks have redefined the ways in which we understand many issues, but in Asian American studies, "transnational" is too often conflated with "trans-Pacific." Paying close attention to the interconnected migrations and remigrations of Asians throughout the 7. Okihiro, "Turning Japanese Americans," 22. Many more of the 20,000 Japanese remaining in Peru would likely have been deported as well, had there been more ships available to transport them. Masterson and Funada-Classen, eds., The Japanese in Latin America, 6. Americas complicates the traditional east-west axis of Asian American studies scholarship and questions how we define both "America" and "Asian America." 72 A hemispheric, inter-American framework illustrates how the United States was not only a common destination for immigrants but also a migratory hub from which other journeys began. 73 Thus, the United States is best understood not in isolation from, but in connection with, Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, Latin America, and the Pacific Rim.
If part of the transnational project has been to decenter the state, I argue that ignoring the nation-state altogether is shortsighted and ahistorical. In the case of Asian exclusion, global racial formation was a product of both global flows of people and ideas across borders as well as national processes of nation-building. Racial formations and the exclusions of the nation-state were and continue to be inextricably related to transnational, imperial, and hemispheric processes.
The history of Asian exclusion in the Americas thus contributes to a larger global history of race by demonstrating how race, migration, and international relations intersect at multiple levelslocally, regionally, nationally, and globally. It challenges the blackwhite paradigm that still dominates global, comparative studies of race. It also confirms the central role that the United States played in the consolidation of white supremacy around the world. 
